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 Plato’s  Protagoras contains, among other things, 1 three short but puzzling remarks 
on the media of philosophy. First, at 328e5–329b1, Plato makes Socrates worry that 
long speeches, just like books, are deceptive, because they operate in a discursive 
mode void of questions and answers. Second, at 347c3–348a2, Socrates argues that 
discussion of poetry is a presumptuous affair, because, the poems’ message, just 
like the message of any written text, cannot be properly examined if the author is not 
present. Third, at 360e6–361d6, it becomes clear that even if the conversation 
between Socrates and Protagoras was conducted by means of short questions and 
answers, this spoken mode of discourse is problematic too, because it ended up 
distracting the inquiry from its proper course. As this paper 2 sets out to argue, Plato 
does not only make Socrates articulate these worries to exhibit the hazards of dis-
cursive commodifi cation. In line with Socrates’ warning to the young Hippocrates 
of the dangers of sophistic rhetoric, and the sophists’ practice of trading in teach-
ings, they are also meant to problematize the thin line between philosophical and 
sophistical practice. By examining these worries in the light of how the three rele-
vant modes of discourse are exemplifi ed in the dialogue, this paper aims to isolate 
and clarify the reasons behind them in terms of deceit, presumptuousness and dis-
1  Nowadays, is often thought that the  Protagoras ’ should be understood in the light of its “negative 
dialectic” and Socrates’ attempt to refute whatever Protagoras is taken to represent. So, e.g. Long 
( 2005 ), McCoy ( 2008 ), Russel ( 2000 ), and Hemmenway ( 1996 ). Cf. also Klosko ( 1980 ), Zeyl 
( 1980 ), and Grube ( 1933 ). This line of thought stands in contrast to the view that the  Protagoras is 
primarily designed to give voice to a set of more positive ideas. The three usual suspects are: (1) 
 the Unity of the Virtues , e.g. Vlastos ( 1972 ); Woodruff ( 1976 ), Kraut ( 1984 ), Penner ( 1973 ), 
Brickhouse and Smith ( 1997 ), and O’Brien ( 2003 ), (2)  the Denial of Akrasia , e.g. Brickhouse and 
Smith ( 2007 ) and Devereux ( 1995 ), and (3) some version of  Hedonism , e.g. Cronquist ( 1975 ) and 
Hackforth ( 1928 ). For a survey, see Lavery ( 2007 ). 
2  I am grateful to Marina McCoy for her comments on an early version of this text. 
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traction; and to argue that these reasons cast doubts on the common assumption that 
the dialogue’s primary aim is to show how sophistical rhetoric must succumb to 
Socratic dialectic (e.g. Long  2005 , 3; Benitez  1992 , 242; Stenzel  1973 , 31). 
 The Nature and Teachability of Virtue 
 Although the self-critical vein of these passages has not received much attention in 
the scholarly literature, 3 the dialogue’s unsettling character is often acknowledged. 4 
Besides the many signs of Protagoras’ reluctance to adapt to what seems to be 
Socrates’ preferred mode of discourse, viz. short questions and answers, and 
Socrates’ repeated failure to meet his own standards, 5 the dialogues’ most promi-
nent disappointment is its failure to settle the questions of what virtue is and whether 
or not it can be taught. 6 Socrates ends his narration of the encounter with Protagoras 
by describing what he considers to have been at stake all along:
 But no, I [sc. Socrates] said, I am asking all of these things for no other reason than a wish 
to investigate (ıțȑȥĮıșĮȚ ȕoȣȜȩȝİȞoȢ) how things concerning virtue stand (ʌ૵Ȣ ʌoĲૃ ਩ȤİȚ 
Ĳ੹ ʌİȡ੿ ĲોȢ ਕȡİĲોȢ), and what virtue itself is (Ĳȓ ʌoĲૃ ਥıĲ੿Ȟ Į੝Ĳȩ, ਲ ਕȡİĲȒ). (360e6–8) 7 
 However, this wish has not been satisfi ed. Should their discourse get a voice (ĳȦȞȒ) 
of its own, Socrates says, it would scorn and laugh at them (361a4–5). By means of 
a subtle distinction between what something is  like and what something  is , Socrates 
explains why:
 And having already gone through these things, I would now like us to go on to investigate 
also what virtue is (ਲȝ઼Ȣ ਥȟİȜșİ૙Ȟ țĮ੿ ਥʌ੿ Ĳ੽Ȟ ਕȡİĲ੽Ȟ ੖ĲȚ ਩ıĲȚȞ), and then once again inves-
tigate whether it is teachable or not (țĮ੿ ʌȐȜȚȞ ਥʌȚıțȑȥĮıșĮȚ ʌİȡ੿ Į੝Ĳo૨ İ੅Ĳİ įȚįĮțĲઁȞ İ੅Ĳİ 
ȝ੽ įȚįĮțĲȩȞ). (361c4–6) 
 Clearly disappointed, Socrates outlines an alternative and better course of action. 
He wants to start the examination of virtue anew, but this time with reference to the 
3  One important exception is Woolf ( 1999 ). Cf. McCoy ( 1999 , 359). The reference to written and 
spoken discourse in the  Protagoras is often mentioned in passing in discussions of the  Phaedrus , 
e.g. Mackenzie ( 1982 ), Murray ( 1988 ), Rowe ( 1986 ), Griswold ( 1986 , esp. 222), and Heath 
( 1989 ). 
4  E.g., Grube ( 1975 , 235). The dialogue’s many logical problems are outlined by Taylor ( 1976 ). 
Vlastos is annoyed ( 1956 , xxiv). Trivigno (2013) argues that the dialogue shows the impossible 
task of interpretation. McCoy ( 1999 , 358) claims that Socrates offers a series of “deliberate mis-
readings”. Griswold ( 1999 , 283) claims that “one of the striking aspects of the […] conversation 
[in the  Protagoras ] is its failure as a philosophical dialogue.” Frede ( 1986 , 736) and Schofi eld 
( 1992 , 132) agree. 
5  Cf. 335a4–8 with 319a8–320c1; 342a6–347a5; 347b8–348a9; 348c5–349d1; 352a1–c7; 
354e3–356c3; 356c4–e4. 
6  So Griswold ( 1999 , 283 and 288), Politis ( 2012 ), and Klosko ( 1980 ). See also Benitez ( 1992 ) and 
Frede ( 1992 ). 
7  If not otherwise stated, the translations are my own. 
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question of what virtue  is . 8 Since both Socrates and Protagoras have said quite a lot 
about virtue, this call for a renewed examination is telling. The dialogue does not 
only lack an account of what virtue  is. All its talk about the qualities of virtue seems 
to have been in vain. Why? 
 Socrates does not elaborate the underlying distinction. But it is in line with what 
Plato has to say about this elsewhere. 9 Although Socrates and Protagoras discuss the 
possible quality of virtue, by considering what virtue can be like (i.e. teachable or 
not), they have not managed to capture that distinguishing feature that makes virtue 
into what it is. The problem, however, is not only that their discussion merely lacks 
vital information on this matter. It has also distracted the search from its proper 
course. Instead of fi rst examining what virtue is, and in turn continue to ask about 
its teachability, the discussion started in the middle and put the examination on the 
wrong track from the beginning. And insofar as the dialogue is read as an explicit 
account of Socrates’ take on virtue, this is clearly problematic. 
 A Warning 
 As recently pointed out, there are however reasons to doubt that the sole aim of the 
 Protagoras is to be an inquiry into what virtue is, and whether or not it can be 
taught. It has accordingly also been argued reasonable to understand the purpose of 
the dialogue in a different light. 10 Read as a preliminary warning of what shall come, 
Socrates’ introductory conversation with the young Hippocrates is telling. Clearly 
with Hippocrates’ naïve trust in Protagoras’ skills in mind (e.g. 310d6, 310e6 or 
312c6), Plato makes Socrates outline the hazards (țȓȞįȣȞoȚ, 313a2) involved. When 
one involves oneself with a sophist, we learn, one risks more than one’s physical 
health. If handled without the proper knowledge, Protagoras’ teachings can affect 
the soul (314b2–3), just like bad food can poison and sicken the body. 
 Socrates introduces his account of these hazards (313c7–314c2) by likening the 
sophist to a trader (਩ȝʌoȡoȢ) or merchant (țȐʌȘȜoȢ, 313c5). Although it is made 
clear that it is hard to pinpoint in what exactly the sophist trades, it has something to 
do with his voice. The sophist, Hippocrates suggests, is the wisest, or most skilled, 
in speaking (cf. 310e6–7: “ıoĳȫĲĮĲoȞ İੇȞĮȚ ȜȑȖİȚȞ”). And, as he continues, the 
sophist is someone in control of making his clients clever speakers (cf. 312d6–7: 
“ਥʌȚıĲȐĲȘȞ Ĳo૨ ʌoȚોıĮȚ įİȚȞઁȞ ȜȑȖİȚȞ”). Without contradicting Hippocrates, 
Socrates also goes on to suggests what this may amount to: The sophist trades in 
8  So Politis ( 2012 , 222). Cf. 360e8–361a3. For discussion of these passages, see Politis ( 2012 , 
210ff), Denyer ( 2012 ), Robinson ( 1953a ), Benson ( 2009 , esp. 18n53), Prior ( 1998 ), and Wolfsdorf 
( 2004 ). 
9  E.g.  Epist. VII . 343b7–c3;  Men. 71a1–72d1;  Rep . 354a12–c3;  Lach . 190b7–c2;  Gorg . 
448e6–449a4. 
10  E.g. McCoy ( 2008 ), Gonzales ( 2000 ), Benitez ( 1992 ), and Griswold ( 1999 ). See also Lavery 
( 2007 ). 
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teachings (ȝĮșȒȝĮĲĮ, 313c7; Gonzalez  2000 , 114 and Griswold  1999 , 299n46). In 
treating the products of his voice as detached commodities (ਕȖȫȖȚȝoȢ, 313c5), 
Protagoras considers discursive interaction to be strictly business. Although he uses 
his voice to defend his teachings in argument – otherwise no one would buy them – 
he does not think that he needs to be personally involved in the practices they 
describe, or in the views they support. 11 
 Although this account of the sophist is articulated before Protagoras himself is 
introduced, it is confi rmed by Protagoras’ own words. 12 Not only is it clear that he 
considers himself a part of a great tradition of poets and musicians, experts profi -
cient primarily in the arts of the voice. Protagoras also emphasizes the competitive 
aspect of his trade by associating its traditions with two athletes (Iccus and 
Herodicus, 316d9–317e1, cf. 332e2–4, 335a4–8 and 337b1). 13 In the long speech 
with which Protagoras introduces his own take on virtue – the so-called  Great 
Speech – the notion of discursive merchandise is also confi rmed. Here, Protagoras 
tells the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus; in the middle of which he also lays 
bare his views on the nature and origin of language. The human voice (ĳȦȞȒ) and 
its ability to articulate words or names (ੑȞȩȝĮĲĮ), he says, was given to humanity 
together with the other arts (ĲȑȤȞĮȚ, 322a6). In this respect, the products of the 
human voice are no different than houses, clothes, sandals, beds and food. On 
Protagoras view, there is supposedly no closer link between the soul and the voice 
than between the producer and the product. Dissociated from political or social skill 
(“Ĳ੽Ȟ ʌoȜȚĲȚț੽Ȟ ĲȑȤȞȘȞ”, 322b8) – a skill later given to humanity by Zeus in the 
form of justice (įȓțȘ) and shame (ĮੁįȫȢ, 322c2) – language and discursive interac-
tion is considered to be a competitive enterprise alien to the bonds that unite people 
in friendship (cf. 322c3: “įİıȝo੿ ĳȚȜȓĮȢ ıȣȞĮȖȦȖoȓ”). 14 
11  So Griswold ( 1999 , 292f.): “[Protagoras’ enchanting voice] is a voice that lets Protagoras make 
himself public but not accountable to others […] The externality to self of sophist discourse is 
implicit in their commodifi cation. [Protagoras] lacks a real interest in his students considered as 
individuals. [H]e does not really care about them in a way that would foster their growth as self-
critical and independent thinkers”. 
12  I am here only discussing some aspects of the way Protagoras is represented in Plato’s dialogue. 
For a discussion of the historical person, see Notomi ( 2013 ) and Woodruff ( 2013 ). 
13  So Schofi eld ( 1992 , 129f.). On Orpheus (poet), Musaeus (poet and mystic) and Herodicus (ath-
lete and sports physician), see Sauppe ( 1889 ). On Iccus (athlete and dietologist), see Adam ( 1893 ). 
On Agathocles and Pythocleides (musicians), see Smith ( 1873 , s.v.  Pythocleides ) and Sauppe 
(1889). 
14  Cf. 322b5. See also McCoy ( 2008 , 63). On Protagoras’ theory of language, see Rademaker 
( 2013 ). 
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 Discursive Hazards 
 Although it may seem to be beyond doubt that Socrates’ introductory account of 
Protagoras’ practice is designed to prepare Hippocrates for the dangers involved in 
interacting with a sophist, it tells us very little about what results this may have in 
actual practice. Further down the line, however, there are three passages that spell 
out the problems in some more detail. 
 The fi rst passage includes a critique of Protagoras’ discursive profi ciency. Having 
just been given a brilliant example of Protagoras’ art, in the form of his long speech 
on virtue, Plato makes Socrates expresses an important worry.
 Should someone consult the public speakers regarding this matter, he would probably hear 
something similar from Pericles or from some other able speaker. But if he should ask them 
something more, they themselves,  just like books , have nothing either to answer or to ask. 
For, if someone poses even some small question about what they have said, they go on 
unless someone interrupts, just like the sound from a copper kettle. And rhetors, in this way, 
when asked small questions, extend the speech at length. (328e5–329b1, italics added) 
 On the face of it, the target is Protagoras’ speech. But, in consequence of Socrates’ 
peculiar way of phrasing the matter, the critique extends beyond its the boundaries. 
In principle, it applies to any mode of discourse similar to what may be communi-
cated in the form of written text. 15 Suggestive, perhaps, of the conceit of Plato’s 
fi ction, Socrates does not comment on this (so, e.g., Woolf  1999 , 21). Instead he 
specifi es the core problem, which seems to be the speech’s length. 16 Why? Socrates’ 
initial response to Protagoras’ words is telling. Long speeches, he says, are enchant-
ing. “As for me”, Socrates explains, “for a good while I was still under his spell (țĮ੿ 
ਥȖઅ ਥʌ੿ ȝ੻Ȟ ʌoȜઃȞ ȤȡȩȞoȞ țİțȘȜȘȝȑȞoȢ)” (328d4–5). Comparing Protagoras with 
Orpheus, with whom Protagoras has just likened himself (316d8), Socrates describes 
Protagoras and his voice (ĳȦȞȒ) in terms of their power to charm and beguile 
(țȘȜİ૙Ȟ, 315a8). 17 Socrates’ introductory way of characterizing Protagoras’ follow-
ers emphasizes this critique. As if in some bewitched trance, they dance around him. 
15  So Woolf ( 1999 , 22). For discussion in relation the  Phaedrus , see Ferrari ( 1987 ) and Pettersson 
( 2013 ). 
16  There are fi ve longer speeches in the dialogue, excluding Socrates’: 316c6–317c5; 320c2–328d2; 
334a3–c6 (Protagoras); 337a1–c4 (Prodicus); 337c6–b2 (Hippias). In these speeches it is possible 
to identify a variety of rhetorical techniques. Three are explicitly mentioned: (1) enchantment 
(328d4–5), (2) argument  ad populum (334c7–8), and (3) diversion (336c4–d2). Despite Socrates’ 
critique of long speeches he sets forth eight by himself: 319a8–320c1; 342a6–347a5; 347b8–348a9; 
348c5–349d1; 352a1–c7; 354e3–356c3; 356c4–e4; 356e5–357e8. For a lucid discussion of 
Socrates’ use of long speeches, see Benitez ( 1992 , esp. 240). 
17  The deceptive character of discourse is also refl ected in Protagoras’ account of the origin of 
language. Besides being disassociated from the arts of social interaction and cooperation, we also 
learn that language is a stolen gift. Taken by Prometheus from the building of Athena and 
Hephaestus – the two deities endowed with the greatest of cunning (ȝોĲȚȢ) – it was given to human-
ity in stealth. For discussion, see Vernant and Detienne ( 1974 ). In Protagoras’ biographical com-
ments, he also explains in what way sophistry is, and has always been, a matter of stealth and 
disguise (e.g. 316d6). 
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They “follow where the voice sounds” (315b1). Just like books, without offering the 
opportunity for questions and answers – a method on which Socrates soon shall 
come to insist – Protagoras’ long speech does not promote critical scrutiny. Instead, 
just like the sound from a gong, it is designed to drown all other voices but its own. 
As we soon shall see in some detail, Socrates has reasons to doubt the benevolence 
of Protagoras’ voice. 
 In a second passage, Socrates outlines a further danger. In terms of his and 
Protagoras’ attempt to interpret a poem by Simonides – on what is means to be a 
good person – Socrates explains that this mode of discourse is dangerous because it 
gives the appearance of being able to accomplish something that it cannot accom-
plish. It is presumptuous.
 It seems to me that conversation about poetry is just like the gatherings of the vulgar and 
ordinary human. Without being able to be together with each other by themselves, when 
they are drinking, using their own voices and their own words, because they lack education, 
they enjoy fl ute-girls, contracting the many voices of the fl ute, and through these voices 
they are together. But when those that gather are beautiful and good, because they have a 
good education, you would see neither fl ute-girls nor dance-girls not harp-girls, for they 
[the well-educated] are together in an appropriate way with each other, without ornaments 
or entertainment, and they speak and listen to each other in turn in an orderly fashion, also 
when they have been drinking. This gathering [of ours] is such, that is, if it consists of men 
of that kind that many of us claim to be. It does not need alien voices or poets, who one 
cannot ask about what they are saying. When such things are introduced into the discourse, 
many say that the poet means this, and others say that the poet means that, because they are 
conversing about a matter that cannot be put to the test. But educated men avoid the delight 
of being together in that way. Instead they are together with each other through one another, 
using their own voices, and they put each other to the test in turns. (347c3–348a2) 
 In contrast to the act of conversing by means of your own voice, Socrates outlines 
the dangers of interpretation. Just as the fi rst passage, these words seem to have a 
specifi c target. As pointed out by Raphael Woolf, “[Socrates’] immediate target is 
the reading and interpreting of poetry, as represented by Simonides’ poem; but of 
course the criticism applies in principle to any form of written word”. 18 With a 
subtle yet clearly self-critical tone, Plato offers his readers reasons to doubt that an 
object of an interpretative act can express an independent teaching of its own. As we 
soon shall see in some more detail, Socrates does not only argue that it is impossible 
to determine the meaning of a voice that has been dissociated from its source. By 
means of staging his own interpretation, he also exposes the presumptions involved 
in such an endeavor. 
 Besides the dangers of deceitful speech and presumptuous interpretation, Plato 
does also make Socrates specify a third discursive hazard. In the light of Socrates’ 
wish to fi nd out what virtue is, and whether or not it can be taught, the conclusion is 
clear. Because it distracted the investigation from its proper course, Socrates’ con-
versation with Protagoras has turned out to be dangerously topsy-turvy (cf. 361c3: 
“ਙȞȦ țȐĲȦ ĲĮȡĮĲĲȩȝİȞĮ įİȚȞ૵Ȣ”). But before we turn to this third danger in more 
detail, let us fi rst take a closer look the fi rst two. 
18  Woolf ( 1999 , 22). So also Trivigno ( 2013 , 541). 
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 Long Speeches 
 Although there may be reasons to consider Protagoras’ speech to be more consistent 
and subtle than Socrates seems to allow, 19 and even if Socrates claims that he does 
not mistrust Protagoras’ capacity to defend himself when questioned (329b1–5), 
Socrates’ critical attitude towards long speeches is beyond doubt. Just like books, 
we learn, they aim to sway their addressees by bypassing the possibility of question-
ing and answering. In this sense they are deceptive. But what exactly are the mecha-
nisms involved here? And what is at stake? 
 If we look at Socrates’ concise way of articulating his critique in the light of 
its explicit target (viz. Protagoras’  Great Speech ) and Protagoras role as a 
teacher, one plausible account emerges. As has been argued, most recently by 
Francisco Gonzalez, Protagoras has reasons to defend his practice as an expert 
and teacher of virtue without offending the democratic point of view of his 
potential customers. 20 But this, as we shall see, he cannot do without hiding his 
true intensions. Protagoras speech is deceptive in this sense. And Socrates sees 
it all along. 
 In reply to Socrates’ suggestion that virtue cannot be taught – with virtue here 
being broadly identifi ed with the political art (ਲ ʌoȜȚĲȚțȒ ĲȑȤȞȘ, 319a4) – Protagoras 
answers that Socrates has missed the point. 21 The fact that the Athenian assembly 
does not call in experts when it comes to political matters, as Socrates has just 
pointed out (319b–e), is not a sign that there is no art to be taught. 22 Instead, 
Protagoras explains, virtue is democratically distributed. In contrast to the other 
arts, given to man by Prometheus, Zeus decided to give political virtue (ਲ ʌoȜȚĲȚțȒ 
ਕȡİĲȒ, 322e2–323a1) to everyone (322c1–323a3). Aware of Socrates’ efforts to 
oppose him to the democratic point of view of the Athenians, Protagoras avoids 
undermining the legitimacy of their constitution. 23 
 In order not to undermine the legitimacy of his own art, Protagoras will however 
also need to defend the opposite position, namely that there is need for his expertise. 
19  E.g. Garver ( 2004 ), Gagarin ( 1969 , 48), Jowett ( 1953 , I.119–31), and Adkins ( 1973 ). See also 
Lavery ( 2007 ). 
20  Gonzalez ( 2000 , 117ff.). So also Stokes ( 1986 , 235). See also Hemmenway ( 1996 ) and Adkins 
( 1973 ). 
21  Since it is not established what virtue is, it is hard to pinpoint exactly against what Protagoras is 
objecting. Frede ( 1992 , xii) notes: “Often this [ʌoȜȚĲȚțȒ ĲȑȤȞȘ] is translated as ‘the art of politics,’ 
but, from the context, what Protagoras has in mind is perhaps rather the art of the citizen, the com-
petence that makes a citizen a good citizen (cf. 319a4–5), part of which is to run one’s household 
properly”. As pointed out by Griswold ( 1999 , 299n46) in view of the sophist’s detachment from 
citizenship, travelling from city to city to sell his goods, the claim that Protagoras considered virtue 
to be a matter of citizenship rings somewhat hollow. 
22  Vlastos ( 1956 , x) points out that Socrates’ silent premise here is that an art is something that is 
“taught to a few by a few”. 
23  So Gonzales ( 2000 , 117). See also Taylor ( 1976 , esp. 83) or Stokes ( 1986 ). 
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In reply to another claim that Socrates makes – that the best citizens cannot teach 
virtue to their sons – Protagoras proceeds to argue that there is something called 
 natural aptitude (cf. 327b8, i.e. being İ੝ĳȣȒȢ). 24 Clearly unjustifi ed in the light of 
his preceding myth, Protagoras compares the art of politics with the art of fl ute- 
playing. Just as in the case of excellent fl ute players there is no reason to think that 
the best citizens beget the best children (327bf). Aptitude pops up here and there. 
And, if someone – like Protagoras (328b1–2) – shows signs of being a little supe-
rior, one should be grateful. 
 Although Protagoras presents this point as in line with his myth, this coherence 
does not seem capable of holding up under further scrutiny. As Socrates points out, 
however, the length of Protagoras’ speech makes any such scrutiny practically 
impossible (328e5–329b1). The simple conclusion we can draw from this limitation 
is however important. For even if there may be reasons to think that Protagoras’ 
speech has other and more subtle virtues, this line of thought may help us to under-
stand Socrates’ worry. Socrates’ identifi cation of the charming and deceptive nature 
of long speeches can be understood in terms of their stealth and lack of argumenta-
tive transparency. Protagoras’ speech shows clear signs of making its point by cov-
ering up its inconsistencies; and Socrates worry can thus be understood in terms of 
the generalized idea that long speeches are persuasive by their ability to hide their 
true intensions. 
 There is another passage in the dialogue that emphasizes this point further: 
Socrates’ own “great” speech. Introduced at 310a7, as an account of his and 
Hippocrates’ early morning meeting and their subsequent encounter with Protagoras, 
the speech does not end until the dialogue does (at 362a4). In the light of Socrates’ 
efforts to undermine and change Protagoras’ preference for long speeches, it soon 
becomes clear that also Socrates’ own long speech is deceptive. 
 Socrates’ explicit attempt to cast doubt on Protagoras’ preferred mode of dis-
course, viz. long speeches (328e5–329b1), is supplemented by an argument from 
pity, beginning at 334c6. Here, Plato makes Socrates appeals to the compassion of 
his audience. As an attempt to dismiss Protagoras’ argument for the multiform 
(ʌoȚțȓȜoȞ) nature of the good (Ĳઁ ਕȖĮșઁȞ, 334b6) Socrates claims that because of 
the length of Protagoras’ defense, and his own forgetfulness, the mode of the present 
argumentation must change. Instead of long speeches, Socrates wants the discus-
sion to consist of short questions and equally short answers. Protagoras, however, is 
not that easily persuaded, and as a consequence Socrates stands up and claims that 
he should leave (335c8). This behavior results in a negotiation of the formal rules of 
the discussion (335c8–338e2) and Protagoras eventually agrees to keep to short 
questions and answers (338e2–5). 
 Leaving aside Socrates’ reasons for wanting to disrupt the argument at this point, 
the deceptive nature of Socrates’ “great” speech should nevertheless be clear. 
Socrates’ appeal to forgetfulness is a trick. Although it is easy to fall for Socrates’ 
24  According to Schofi eld ( 1992 , 128n8–9) neither this, nor Socrates’ fi rst objection against the 
teachability of virtue, are original: The fi rst was a well-known topic of sophistic debate. The sec-
ond is to be found in  Dissoi Logoi (Diels-Kranz 90.6). 
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charm, it is clear that he is not honest, because it is beyond doubt that Socrates is 
able to remember more than one Stephanus page of argument. Socrates is not trying 
to express his honest beliefs (as suggested at 331c4–d1). And even if we might 
accept Socrates’ argument from pity anyway, as Alcibiades seems to do (336d2–4), 
Socrates’ critique of the deceptiveness of long speeches seems to be confi rmed also 
by his own words. 25 
 Interpretation of Poetry 
 If what has been stated above is on target, Socrates considers long speeches to be 
dangerous because they are deceptive. This danger may however seem to be easily 
counteracted. By means of analysis and interpretation one should be able to detect 
cunning tricks and inconsistencies. Within the framework of the new rules of 
communication established after Socrates’ attempt to leave (335c8–338e2), the 
 Protagoras also offers two telling examples of how interpretation and analysis 
can expose contradictions and disguised motives: Protagoras’ analysis of 
Simonides’ poem, on what it means to be a good person; and, Socrates’ own. 26 
Eventually, Socrates will of course draw the conclusion that also this discursive 
mode is problematic. Just like the interpretation of any text, discussion of poetry 
will turn out to be presumptuous. In order to understand why Socrates draws this 
conclusion, let us take a closer look at some parts of the passages that exemplifi es 
this practice. 
 Having agreed to keep to short questions and answers, Protagoras continues in a 
more conversational mode by asking Socrates to react to his interpretation of the 
poem (339a5). Vindicating his interpretative effort by the claim that “the greatest 
part of a man’s education is to be skilled in the matter of verse” (338e6–339a1), 
Protagoras explains that Simonides’ poem is inconsistent.
 First he [Simonides] laid it down himself that  it is hard for a man to become good in truth 
(ȤĮȜİʌઁȞ İੇȞĮȚ ਙȞįȡĮ ਕȖĮșઁȞ ȖİȞȑıșĮȚ ਕȜĮșİȓ઺), and then a little further on in his poem he 
forgot, and he proceeds to blame Pittacus for saying the same as he did –  that it is hard to 
be good (ȤĮȜİʌઁȞ ਥıșȜઁȞ ਩ȝȝİȞĮȚ), and refuses to accept from him the same statement that 
he made himself. (339d1–6) 27 
 Socrates’ answer, and his own interpretation of the poem, can be analyzed in three 
parts. 28 The fi rst (339e–342a) briefl y defends the poems’ consistency in arguing that 
it builds on a distinction between being and becoming (“Ĳઁ ȖİȞȑıșĮȚ țĮ੿ Ĳઁ İੇȞĮȚ”, 
25  The two modes of deception exemplifi ed by Protagoras’ and Socrates’ “great” speeches, enchant-
ment and diversion, are mentioned at 328d4–5 and 336c4–d2. For discussion, see Benitez ( 1992 , 
240). 
26  The poem is reconstructed and translated by Bowra ( 1961 , 326–36). Cf. McCoy ( 1999 , 365n6). 
27  My italics. Translation by Lamb ( 1967 ). 
28  So Frede ( 1986 , 739). It is divided differently in McCoy ( 1999 , 352) and Trivigno ( 2013 , 515). 
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340b5). The second (342a–343c5) concludes with the claim that Simonides’ pur-
pose was to undermine the wise Pittacus’ authority and gain a reputation of being 
wise himself (343b–c). 29 The third continues the defense of Simonides. Let us look 
at a few telling moves in the third part. 30 
 One line from the poem is crucial: “ It is hard to be good (ȤĮȜİʌઁȞ ਥıșȜઁȞ 
਩ȝȝİȞĮȚ)” (343d4). According to any standard interpretation, Simonides ascribes 
this line to Pittacus and objects by saying that this cannot be right, because only 
the gods can be good. 31 The permanent condition of  being good is not hard to 
reach, but impossible. Subject to great external forces, a human can only be good 
for a moment. Identifying the conditions of goodness with something like “wealth, 
physical attractiveness and power” (McCoy  1999 , 351), this means that what 
decides whether a person is able to be good, or act well, depends on fortune and 
misfortune. 
 Another line states the poems’ moral conclusion: “ But I praise and love everyone 
willingly committing no baseness (ʌȐȞĲĮȢ įૃ ਥʌĮȓȞȘȝȚ țĮ੿ ĳȚȜȑȦ/ਦțઅȞ ੖ıĲȚȢ ਪȡįૉ/
ȝȘį੻Ȟ ĮੁıȤȡȩȞ)” (345d3–4). Instead of praising whoever has had the fortune of 
being able to act in a good way, we should praise the one who does not deliberately 
try to be bad. 
 Socrates does not endorse this reading. First, he claims that Simonides does not 
reproach Pittacus for saying that the conditions of goodness cannot be wealth, phys-
ical attractiveness and power, but that Simonides reproaches Pittacus for saying that 
the conditions of goodness cannot be  knowledge . Second, this implies that Simonides 
does not mean to say that we should praise the one who does not do wrong willingly, 
but that it is knowledge we should praise, and the one who has it. In order to reach 
this unforeseeable conclusion Socrates’ argument goes through several steps. The 
following are revealing of his purpose. 
 First, he argues that misfortune cannot infl uence someone that is already bad, 
“just as you cannot knock down one who is lying down” (344c7–8). Only someone 
29  This second part has a comic ring. In the light of Socrates’ earlier declaration that he wants to 
converse by means of short questions and answers, and further, with regard to the fact that he was 
going to answer in an exemplary way (338d), the length of Socrates’ speech must to be some kind 
of joke. 
30  There are many excellent commentaries on Socrates’ (and Protagoras’) reading of Simonides’ 
poem. See, e.g., McCoy ( 1999 ), Trivigno ( 2013 ), Frede ( 1986 ), and Pappas ( 1989 ). My purpose of 
bringing this up is not to develop a new reading, but only to lay bare how Socrates’ interpretation 
of the poem corresponds to his own critique of interpretation. 
31  In reference to Bowra ( 1934 ) and Woodbury ( 1953 ), McCoy ( 1999 , 351) argues that most com-
mentators, except Socrates (as we shall see), read the poem along these lines: “Most commentators 
see Simonides poem as presenting the following view: excellence as traditionally understood (e.g., 
possessing the traits of wealth, physical attractiveness, and power) is diffi cult to attain and impos-
sible to keep for long. Because human beings universally act badly in the face of misfortune […] 




who is resourceful (İ੝ȝȒȤĮȞoȢ, 344d1) can be affected by that type of misfortune 
Simonides calls  helpless disaster (“ਕȝȒȤĮȞoȢ ıȣȝĳoȡ੹”, 344c5). 32 
 Second, Socrates investigates what we should take such misfortune or disaster to 
mean. In analyzing the relevant line in Simonides’ poem – “If he has fared (ʌȡȐȟĮȢ) 
well (İ੣), every man is good (ਕȖĮșȩȢ); but bad (țĮțȩȢ), if ill (țĮț૵Ȣ)” (344e7–8) – 
Socrates uses an example; and asks: What type of faring well (İ੝ʌȡĮȖȓĮ) makes a 
doctor good (ਕȖĮșȩȢ, 345a2)? Phrased in negative terms, Socrates answers that the 
only thing that can make a doctor fair ill is the loss of knowledge (ਥʌȚıĲȒȝȘ, 345b5). 
 Third, having thus established knowledge as the condition of goodness, Socrates 
draws the conclusion. Against any standard reading, he argues that Simonides does 
not conclude that “I praise and love everyone willingly committing no baseness 
(ʌȐȞĲĮȢ įૃ ਥʌĮȓȞȘȝȚ țĮ੿ ĳȚȜȑȦ/ਦțઅȞ ੖ıĲȚȢ ਪȡįૉ/ȝȘį੻Ȟ ĮੁıȤȡȩȞ)” (345d3–5). 
Dismissing, in passing, the thought that it is possible to do bad by intent 
(345d6–345e4), Socrates explains that the  by intent or  willingly (ਦțȫȞ) does not 
describe the motivation of the person performing the act, but the motivation of 
Simonides. Socrates reads the  willingly (ਦțȫȞ) together with the “I praise and love 
(ਥʌĮȓȞȘȝȚ țĮ੿ ĳȚȜȑȦ)”. 33 And thus, we learn, the one that Simonides is willing to 
praise is anyone who does not do bad (੖ıĲȚȢ ਪȡįૉ/ȝȘį੻Ȟ ĮੁıȤȡȩȞ). 
 Fourth, in the light of Socrates’ former arguments, this position is not as uncon-
troversial as it may seem. Having shown (1) that misfortune can only infl uence 
someone with knowledge, (2) that only such a person can ever do any good, and (3) 
that a permanent state of goodness is impossible for a human, Socrates’ conclusion, 
that those whom Simonides is willing to praise are the-ones-in-between (cf. 346d3: 
Ĳ੹ ȝȑıĮ), implies that they are persons with knowledge (cf. 346d1–2). 34 
 Let us now step back a little and ask what is going on in these passages. What is 
Socrates doing? Despite the wide range of different interpretations, there is a basic 
consensus. 35 Socrates is not only “systematically misreading Simonides” (Pappas 
 1989 , 249), but, “at the expense of honest hermeneutics” (McCoy  1999 , 355), he 
“distorts the text” (Trivigno  2013 , 520) and “imposes, consciously and forcefully, 
his own tenets on the poem” (Frede  1986 , 740). 36 But how is this possible and what 
is the point? 
 First, it is clear that both Protagoras and Socrates exploit the poem. This point is 
also emphasized by their agreement to play by the same rules. While Protagoras 
uses the poem to show off his skill in the matter of verse (338e6–339a1, cf, Trivigno 
32  The adjective ਕȝȒȤĮȞoȢ can, according to McCoy ( 1999 , 355), mean both “lacking means” and 
“being such that no means will do”, the latter being used here. Cf. Trivigno ( 2013 , 522). 
33  Cf. Trivigno (2013, 521 and 523) and Pappas ( 1989 , 250). 
34  The type of knowledge at stake here is controversial. It is however beyond the scope of this paper 
to adjudicate the debate. For discussion, see McCoy ( 1999 ), Frede ( 1986 ), and Trivigno ( 2013 , 
525). 
35  As pointed out by Pappas ( 1989 , 249) and Trivigno ( 2013 , 520). 
36  At a fi rst glance, Frede may seem to oppose this general agreement, arguing that Socrates’ read-
ing of Simonides’ poem is “basically sound” (737). Later (740) she does however add that this in 
not supposed to “imply that Socrates really thinks that he is rendering Simonides’ own 
intentions”. 
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 2013 ), Socrates uses it to sanction a set of tenets alien to the poem (Frede  1986 , 746; 
cf. Pappas  1989 ). As Socrates soon comes to point out, however, this instrumental 
treatment presumed too much; and was, therefore, dangerous. Their contest of inter-
pretation presupposed that there was a defi nite and consistent message to be 
extracted from the poem (339b6–9, cf. McCoy  1999 , 353; Trivigno  2013 , 516). And 
accordingly, their contest also assumed that it was possible to extract a message 
from a medium that, at least according to what Plato makes Socrates say, cannot 
carry such a load. For although, as Socrates puts it, “many say that the poet means 
this, and others say that the poet means that”, he makes it perfectly clear that this is 
just because they are “conversing about a matter that they cannot put to the test 
(įȚĮȜİȖȩȝİȞoȚ ੔ ਕįȣȞĮĲo૨ıȚ ਥȟİȜȑȖȟĮȚ)” (347e4–7). Their interpretative contest 
was presumptuous because it claimed to be able to accomplish what could not be 
accomplished by means of the established rules. 
 Whether or not Socrates is right in this, it is at least reasonably clear that Socrates 
is not only trying to  tell Hippocrates why intercourse with Protagoras is dangerous, 
he also wants to  show him this. When uncared for and exploited, no written text 
offers any message to be put to the test. But interpretative endeavors such as the 
ones we are offered make us think otherwise. And this is dangerous, not only 
because they build on a set of presuppositions that dissociate speaker and voice, but 
also because they sanction the treatment of the voice as merchandise. 
 Short Questions and Answers 
 So far we have seen that Socrates has reason to consider two modes of discourse 
hazardous. Long speeches are deceptive and interpretation of poetry presumptuous. 
Accordingly, and as Socrates is often taken to insist, there seems to be only one 
viable alternative left: short questions and answers. The more conversational parts 
of the dialogue are also often labeled  dialectical and taken to be Socrates’ preferred 
mode of discourse. 37 But Socrates’ fi nal verdict of his conversation with Protagoras 
seems to tell otherwise. Despite the fact that the discussion has progressed by ask-
ing and answering questions, it has missed its target entirely. Indicative of the pur-
pose of Plato’s text, Socrates leaves little room for doubt. The results of the 
conversation have turned out to be dangerously topsy-turvy (cf. 361c3: “ਙȞȦ țȐĲȦ 
ĲĮȡĮĲĲȩȝİȞĮ įİȚȞ૵Ȣ”) and absurd (ਙĲoʌoȢ, 361a5). If we take a closer look at some 
parts of the dialogue that exemplifi es the mode of discussion that is at stake here, 
37  E.g. Long ( 2005 , 3), Gonzales ( 2000 , 132f), and Benitiez ( 1992 , 242). Benson ( 2006 ) argues that 
the substantive expression, ਲ įȚĮȜİțĲȚțȒ, is not frequent in Plato, while the infi nitive is. In the 
 Protagoras Socrates repeatedly says that he and Protagoras should try  to converse (įȚĮȜȑȖİıșĮȚ, 
e.g. 316c3). This expression (used 32 times) is translate by Notomi ( 2004 , 1) as “engaging in dia-
logue”. The difference between Socrates and Protagoras’ use of this terminology is discussed by 
Burnyeat ( 2013 , 419ff.). See also Benson ( 2006 ) and Robinson ( 1953b ). 
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Socrates’ reasons to consider himself entitled to draw this conclusion becomes 
clearer. 
 At around 348c5, the dialogue begins to pursue in a more conversational manner. 
After a short summary of Protagoras’ view on the unity of the virtues (349b1–349c5), 
Socrates asks whether Protagoras has changed his mind. Protagoras answers that 
although all of the virtues are fairly alike (cf. 349d3–4: “ਥʌȚİȚț૵Ȣ ʌĮȡĮʌȜȒıȚĮ 
ਕȜȜȒȜoȚȢ ਥıĲȓȞ”) courage is a virtue one can have without the others (349d5–8). In 
his reply to Protagoras, Socrates poses a series of questions designed to undermine 
Protagoras’ position. 
 Socrates’ fi rst attempt (349e1–350c5) is telling for what shall come. On the 
assumption that courageous men are bold, and in getting Protagoras to admit that 
divers and horsemen with knowledge are bolder than those without, Socrates begins 
by trying to make Protagoras accept the thought that it must be knowledge that dis-
tinguishes courage. Since there are men without knowledge who nevertheless are 
considered to be bold, as Protagoras concedes, Socrates pushes Protagoras into say-
ing that these men must be mad. And since Protagoras cannot allow himself to 
admit that mad men can be courageous, there is only one alternative left: knowl-
edge. Since (1) courageous men are bold, (2) knowledge decides a man’s level of 
boldness, and (3) mad men cannot be courageous, it seems to follow that knowledge 
distinguishes courage. And thus, on the assumption that knowledge and wisdom can 
be equated, Socrates tries to lure Protagoras into admitting that courage is not pos-
sible without wisdom. 38 Protagoras is, however, not such an easy prey; and, as we 
know, he catches Socrates in the act (cf. 350c5-351b2). Protagoras sees that Socrates 
is trying to deceive him: If one can draw the conclusion that courage is not possible 
without knowledge from the thought that knowledge conditions courage, he says, it 
should also be sound to claim that it is not possible to be strong without knowledge. 
In wrestling, Protagoras points out, someone that knows how to wrestle is clearly 
more powerful than someone that does not. But even if this is true, and knowledge 
makes one wrestler more powerful than another, it is nevertheless absurd to con-
clude that one cannot be strong without knowledge. Even if knowledge may help to 
make a person bold, courage cannot be knowledge. 
 At this stage of the discussion, Socrates abruptly breaks the argument off (351b3). 
Without further comments, he changes the subject. The silence is telling. It is clear 
that Protagoras is not that easily deceived. Socrates need to be more refi ned than 
so-far to get Protagoras where he wants him. Socrates’ proceeding argument is also 
much more sophisticated than the fi rst. 
 Socrates begins again by trying to make Protagoras accept the thought that to live 
in pleasure is to live well. Protagoras’ unwillingness to agree to this, without quali-
fi cation, triggers a further argument to the same point. First, Socrates commits 
Protagoras to the claim that knowledge is the most forceful power (țȡȐĲȚıĲoȢ, 
352d2) in human action (352c8–d3). And then he goes on to ask whether Protagoras 
agrees with the opinion of  the many (“oੂ ʌoȜȜo੿”, 352d5), that is, insofar as they 
38  Knowledge (ਥʌȚıĲȒȝȘ) and wisdom (ıoĳȓĮ) are often interchangeable, e.g., 352d1–2. So Taylor 
( 1976 , 152). 
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think that it is possible to be overcome by pleasure (“ਸ਼ĲĲȦ İੇȞĮȚ Ĳ૵Ȟ ਲįoȞ૵Ȟ”, 
353c2), even if one  knows that what one is about to do is bad (cf. 353c7: 
“ȖȚȖȞȫıțoȞĲİȢ ੖ĲȚ ʌoȞȘȡȐ ਥıĲȚȞ”). Protagoras answers that the many are wrong. 39 
 Symptomatic of the argumentative strategy at play, Socrates goes on to ask how 
badness is to be understood. Arguing that a temporary act of satisfying one’ plea-
sures can result in future pains, Socrates concludes that the many cannot mean that 
an act is bad (țĮțȩȢ) because it gives temporary pleasure. Instead they must mean 
that the act is bad because it yields future pains (353d8–e1). Socrates then goes on 
to show that the principles of this hedonistic calculus must also be valid in the oppo-
site case. And thus, since the many thinks that it is the sum of the pain/pleasure 
balance that determines the value of an act, they are apparently also committed to 
the thought that despite temporary pains – such as in gymnastics or war – an act is 
called good (ਕȖĮșȩȢ), if its future results are pleasant, such as in health or wealth 
(354b1–5). 40 Protagoras concedes. 
 The conclusion that Socrates draws from this is the following. The phrase  being 
overcome by pleasure , really means  being overcome by the good ; and accordingly it 
would of course be absurd to claim that “a man does bad […] because he is over-
come by the good” (355d1–3). As Protagoras is now forced to admit, the many are 
confused. And Protagoras agrees that it is reasonable to think that the good is some 
form of pleasure (356c3). 
 After a shorter elaboration of this argument in terms of an  art of measurement 
(often taken to further establish the connection between the hedonistic calculus and 
knowledge) Socrates returns to courage and wisdom. 41 By fi rst opening up the argu-
ment to objections, but without getting any, Socrates establishes an argumentative 
consensus to the effect that the good is to be considered to be some form of pleasure 
(354e8–355a4, cf. 354c3, 354d1–4 and 354b8–c2); and then goes on to ask what 
makes a man coward. Fear, he proposes, is the expectation of something bad. The 
proper example, we learn, is war. But since war, as Protagoras certainly thinks, is 
something honorable (țĮȜȩȞ, 359e5), it appears to be something good. Without 
questioning this premise, Socrates goes on to say that since the good is taken to be 
some form of pleasure, war must also be pleasurable. Accordingly, Socrates can 
also explain why the coward runs away from the battle-fi eld. He is ignorant. Without 
being able to estimate the proper pain/pleasure-balance, he does not  know what is to 
be feared. But the brave one does. He sees the pleasures waiting for him at the bat-
tle’s end. And, thus, since courage is the opposite of cowardice, courage is 
wisdom. 
39  On Socrates’ use the imaginary interlocutor, see Gonzales ( 2000 ) and Moss ( 2013 ). Schofi eld 
( 1992 , 134) argues the fi ctive opponent in invented so as to forge an artifi cial solidarity between 
Socrates and Protagoras. 
40  As pointed out by Frede ( 1992 , xxviif), it is not clear what type of hedonism Socrates presup-
poses here. 
41  For discussion, see McCoy ( 2008 , esp. 57), Brickhouse and Smith ( 1997 ), Hackforth ( 1928 ), and 
Irwin ( 1977 ). 
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 In the light of what happens in this argument, Socrates’ conclusion that his con-
versation with Protagoras has turned out to be dangerously topsy-turvy may seem to 
be less strange than at fi rst sight. With regard to Socrates’ critique of long speeches 
and interpretation of poetry, Socrates is clearly aware of the dangers of deception 
and presumptuousness. Socrates’ strategy in this argument is however not much 
better. There are at least three reasons. 
 First, the details of Socrates’ line of reasoning reveal that his argument was not 
particularly transparent. Besides the seductive use of an imaginary interlocutor, 
there are clearly argumentative options that Socrates omits. The fact that bad acts 
can be traced to ignorance, for example, does not require that courage be the same 
as wisdom. For even on Socrates’ hedonistic calculus, it is still possible that the 
future pleasures resulting from running away from the battle-fi eld may be greater 
than the pleasures resulting from staying. There is no necessary connection estab-
lished between running away and future pains, in the same sense as there is a neces-
sary connection between gluttony and future pains, for example (cf. Moss  2013 , 
27f.). In addition, the entire argument to the effect that the coward is ignorant is 
based on a premise that Socrates, just a few pages above, has denied (341b1–c2). 
With the aid of Prodicus, Socrates made it perfectly clear that war is to be consid-
ered something bad (țĮțȩȢ, 341b6), not something honorable (țĮȜȩȞ). Revealing of 
what is going on in this argument, this is a point that Socrates now remarkably 
appears to have forgotten. 
 Second, the deceptive nature of Socrates’ words is also apparent in the general 
form of his argumentative strategy. Although Socrates repeatedly insists on the non- 
competitive ambition of his questions, there are strong reasons to doubt his sincer-
ity. Besides the fact that he actually manages to win the argument (360d5–e5), 
Protagoras also admits his lost (cf. 361d4–362a1). The conversation about courage 
and wisdom has clearly not been any kind of joint search. It has been a competition. 
And from this point of view, its lack of argumentative transparency is not surprising. 
Socrates does not try to make all the options and steps of the argument evident, so 
as to secure that Protagoras understands the deductive moves of the inquiry, because 
Socrates is not trying to make him follow. He is trying to make him contradict some-
thing he has said before. By fi rst probing for Protagoras’ level of competence, 
Socrates goes on to launch an attack that eventually will make his opponent give in. 
 Third, even if one may be inclined to argue that Socrates’ argument is not decep-
tive, but only lacking, one must take the following points into consideration. Besides 
the fact that the conclusion Socrates draws regarding courage and wisdom builds on 
assumptions that he does not allow elsewhere, neither in the  Protagoras (341b1–c2) 
nor in other dialogues (e.g.  Gorg .494e9–497a5,  Rep .505b5–11 or  Phil .20e4–21a2), 
this conclusion is of course also incompatible with the dialogues’ aporetic end. If 
the conclusion that courage is wisdom would have been reached by the proper 
means, Socrates would have no reasons to doubt its validity. But Socrates makes it 
perfectly clear that he has. In addition, if Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras 
would have been correctly oriented, one could have expected Socrates to show some 
awareness of the limitations of their pursuit. Instead of offering a presumptuous 
account claiming to have established something it did not have the means to estab-
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lish, the conversation should have been performed in a discursive mode able to 
properly asses its own accomplishments. Yet, it is clear that we have nothing of that 
sort. On the grounds that the question of the quality of virtue was asked before the 
question of its being was even posed, Socrates says that if they are to investigate the 
subject matter in a proper way, they will need to start anew (361c4–6). 42 However 
important a lesson this may be, it seems reasonable to say that Socrates, at least, 
would not want to describe the conversation in the  Protagoras to be an example of 
proper dialectic. But what is it then? 
 A Sophistical Practice 
 As Michael Frede has argued, there are two important things to keep in mind. First, 
the conversation between Socrates and Protagoras in the  Protagoras cannot be seen 
in isolation. Rather, it should be understood as an example of a larger  sophistical 
practice. 43 The rules are simple. In trying to get the respondent to contradict a for-
merly given statement, one person asks the questions and the other answers with yes 
or no. According to Frede “Socrates’ mastery of this practice is such that he man-
ages to ‘refute’ the respondent even where we have some reasons to believe that 
Socrates actually shared the respondent’s view”. 44 Second, even if there are reasons 
to think that the  Protagoras contains examples of proper Socratic tenets, we cannot 
be sure, because “Socrates could manage to refute any thesis”. 45 According to Frede, 
there is, however, one thing that we can be more certain about. The conversation in 
the dialogue is part of a tradition. It is part of a tradition that is supposed to stand in 
contrast to the one Plato wanted to establish. And if this is correct, Plato certainly 
had reasons to include also the discursive mode of short questions and answers in 
the dialogue. In accordance with Socrates’ ambition to show Hippocrates the haz-
ards of his trust in discursive profi ciency, Plato had reasons to show his readers that 
there is no guarantee that short questions and answers will put you on the right path. 
When an inquiry is pursued along the lines of Socrates and Protagoras’ conversa-
tion, conversation can be just as dangerous as long speeches and interpretation of 
poetry can be. The briefness of its questions and answers may give the appearance 
of making all the steps of the investigation transparent. And in pursuing its path by 
means of agreement or consensus it can give the appearance of being on the right 
track ( Pace Long  2005 ). But, just as in the case of long speeches, these appearances 
42  Politis ( 2012 , 223) puts it accurately: “[I]f they [Socrates and Protagoras] want the inquiry to 
arrive at a clear, manifest and stable outcome, they must change their line of inquiry”. So also 
Taylor ( 1976 ) and Guthrie ( 1961 ). 
43  Frede ( 1992 , xvff). Nehamas ( 1990 , 5) agrees, questioning a tradition going back to Sidgwick 
and Grote. 
44  Frede ( 1992 , xvii). E.g. Protagoras’ refuted attempt to reject hedonism. Cf.  Gorg. 494e9–497a5 , 
Rep. 505b5-11  or Phil. 20e4–21a2. For discussion, see also Moss ( 2013 ). 
45  Frede ( 1992 , xvii). 
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are deceptive. The conversation may hide its gaps and traps in long and complex 
arguments that, in retrospect, can be said to be just as presumptuous as interpreta-
tion of poetry. Because insofar as Socrates is right in claiming that both his own and 
Protagoras’ contributions were quite out of place (ਙĲoʌoȢ, 361a5), it is clear that 
their particular mode of discourse distracted the inquiry from it proper course. 
 Conclusion: Dangerous Voices 
 In line with Socrates’ initial warning to the young Hippocrates of what may hap-
pened when one involves oneself with a sophist, we have seen that Socrates’ cri-
tique of long speeches, discussion of poetry and short questions and answers are not 
only possible to understand in terms of their deceitful, presumptuous and distracting 
characteristics. The dialogue also stages these three modes of discourse in a way 
that lets us appreciate Socrates’ reasons to worry. But this calls for a concluding 
question: Are the three criticized modes of discourse just random cases, or are they 
chosen, with care, to emphasize some common problem? 
 As we saw at the outset of this paper, the three passages were Plato makes 
Socrates articulates his worries are all phrased in self-critical terms. The target of 
Socrates’ critique of long speeches applies to any form of discourse similar to what 
may be expressed in a book. His critique of interpretation of poetry applies, in prin-
ciple, to any form of written word. And Socrates’ fi nal evaluation of the accom-
plishments of his conversation with Protagoras shows all the signs of being a 
self-critical assessment of the outcome of Plato’s text. In all of these passages the 
written word seems to be the paradigmatic target of critique. 
 As we have seen, in his critique of long speeches Socrates also emphasizes the 
difference between what is spoken and what is written. But this difference is care-
fully qualifi ed. Just as Socrates insists in the  Phaedrus (e.g. 259e1–6, 275c3–d2, 
276a5-6 and 277e5–278b4), the difference between what is spoken and what is 
written is not always coextensive with voice and text. In the form of public speeches 
or rhetorical display, the spoken word is liable to the same charges as what may be 
written in a book. And although Socrates’ critique of interpretation of poetry empha-
sizes the difference between the exercise of you own voice and the act of textual 
interpretation, Socrates’ fi nal evaluation of his discussion with Protagoras, I have 
argued, shows that a spoken conversation can be just as deceptive as a book, or just 
as presumptuous as an act of interpretation. Accordingly, it does not seem to be the 
paper and the ink that is the problem, but some feature of language and discursive 
interaction that can be represented by a text. 
 In order to pinpoint what this feature is, Socrates’ introductory conversation with 
Hippocrates is telling. 46 As we have seen, one central point of Socrates’ argument 
here is that Protagoras treats his voice as merchandise. Just as Socrates presumes in 
46  For a lucid discussion on how Socrates’ initial conversation with Hippocrates is designed to 
prepare the reader for what the rest of the dialogue shall offer, see Schofi eld ( 1992 , 125f.). 
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his mock interpretation of Simonies’ written poem, Protagoras considers his teach-
ings to be products with a message that can change hands without any loss of con-
tent. In this light, a text seems to be the perfect paradigm for the results of discursive 
commodifi cation. Dissociable from its source of origin, just like Protagoras’ teach-
ings, it is treated as independent and self-contained. And it has no indispensable link 
to its originator. But this, of course, is problematic, because as Socrates suggests in 
his critique of interpretation of poetry, no text can carry such a load. If we want to 
know what thought the text is designed to capture, we will need to talk to its author. 
Why? Insofar as we can assume that there are no texts with souls, the reason seems 
to be clear. Only souls can entertain thoughts. But what does this mean? One sug-
gestion would be that while an ensouled voice can be said to be conditioned by an 
internal difference that allows it to take itself as an object of thought, a text is simple 
and one-sided. Self-evident as it may seem, a text does not have access to the inter-
nal operations by means of which its expressions have come to be formed, and it 
cannot see beyond its own position, however subtle and self-critical this may be. But 
all voices that are treated as texts share this lack. Just as long speeches and premedi-
tated positions, texts are one-directed. They cannot adapt to their counterparts and 
they cannot choose their words with care of theirs addressees’ point of view. They 
can only speak, not listen. In a more Platonic vocabulary this would mean that a 
voice that is treated as a text is denied the ability to entertain a dialogue; an ability 
without which it becomes thoughtless. It cannot nourish and sustain the unassuming 
conditions of an open-ended investigation. Instead, it can only represent a certain 
position. And in contrast to a voice that is open to dialogue, a voice that is treated as 
a text is only open to competition and exploitation. 
 As we have seen, in the examples of the three distinct modes of discourse that 
Socrates criticizes in the  Protagoras , these ideas are confi rmed. Not only is it clear 
that Socrates considers Protagoras’ long speech to be an example of a type of dis-
course that lacks the ability to listen and answer to questions. Socrates’ treatment of 
Simonides poem also shows what is at stake. Exemplifi ed by his exploitation of its 
words, Socrates outlines the fate of desouled voices. Although they may seem to be 
able to communicate some important thought, this is just as charade. When dis-
torted or criticized, they cannot continue the discussion by correcting the misunder-
standings or admitting their mistakes. Instead they are at the mercy of the interpreter. 
And the voice of the text can be exploited for whatever end he prefers. Socrates’ 
discussion with Protagoras extends these ideas to a spoken situation. Protagoras is 
considered to represent a certain preconceived position. And Socrates’ exploitation 
of his voice confi rms this view. Although he eventually admits the dangerous and 
absurd nature of their discursive competition, Socrates’ actual treatment of 
Protagoras in the conversation is quite straightforward. In line with Protagoras’ 
treatment of himself and his teachings, Socrates exploits the position Protagoras 
considers himself to represent. Indicative of the fact that he does not really think that 
Protagoras can or is willing to listen, Socrates shows no signs of being ready to tell 
the sophist his true intensions. Instead he deceives. Phrasing his arguments so as to 
align them with Protagoras’ point of view, Socrates exploits whatever weaknesses 
he sees in Protagoras’ position and uses this to win the game. But as the end of the 
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dialogue makes clear, this is a failure. As it comes to success in the matter of virtue, 
the dialogue identifi es no winners. And even if one may think that Plato just decided 
to illustrate this activity so as to warn his readers of the time-wasting effects of 
 intellectual sports, Plato’s account of Socrates’ warning to Hippocrates suggests 
that the matter may be more serious. Phrased within the conceit of Plato’s fi ction, 
Socrates warns Hippocrates that his very soul is at stake. If one is not careful, we 
learn, the soul may get poisoned and corrupted by Protagoras’ voice, just like bad 
food can poison and sicken the body. However, as should be reasonably clear by 
now, Socrates’ warning is not confi ned to Protagoras’ voice alone. Instead, it is 
designed to prepare the reader for what shall come. And as we have seen, the dia-
logue’s account of the hazards of discursive commodifi cation extends far beyond 
the sophist’s teachings. All texts, it seems, and all voices that are treated as texts, 
share the same problem. By promoting the illusory stability of well-defi ned and 
independent positions, they undermine the virtue of a sensitive and attentive mode 
of discourse. By means of their deceptive charm, long speeches may paralyze the 
process of unassuming inquiry. By sanctioning the dissociation of voice and soul, 
interpretation of poetry promotes the presumptuous ideal of self-contained teach-
ings; and conversations that promote the battle of positions replace the search for 
clarity with deception and trickery. All commodifi ed voices are dangerous in this 
way. But Plato’s text has some unusual features; and it is different from many others 
voices. By including a critique of the very medium by means of which it operates, 
it arms its readers with a set of tools that makes it possible to dismantle its deceptive 
charm. By means of its self-critical vein, or, as one scholar has described it, its inter-
nal self- contradiction (Woolf  1999 , 28), the  Protagoras promote thinking at the 
expense of teaching. Instead of asking us to chisel out its true meaning and live our 
lives accordingly, Plato’s  Protagoras suggests another alternative. Although stated 
very brief, the notion of a teaching, used to describe what Protagoras is selling, is 
contrasted to another type of knowledge. Against the background of Socrates’ 
account of Protagoras’ commodifi cation of his voice and the dangers of discursive 
merchandise, Plato makes Socrates suggest that there is more to learn than teach-
ings. Compared with the expertise of the doctor, Socrates outlines a type of knowl-
edge that seems to be immune to commodifi cation. For in granting its possessor the 
ability to evaluate what teachings are good and what teachings are bad, it seems to 
render all such teachings useless. If you already have the capacity to know what is 
good and bad for the soul, what use are teachings? Revealing of what the rest of the 
dialogue shall offer, Socrates never answers this question. And he never explains 
what this type of knowledge amounts to. Both Socrates and Hippocrates, we learn, 
“are still a little too young to get to the bottom of such a great matter” (314b5–7). 
And instead they go and talk to Protagoras. 
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